INDIA COMPUTERS STOLEN FROM NAVYStolen SecretsDate : 2005-08-11
Stolen Secrets
By Vinod Vedi - Syndicate Features

It appears to be “open house” for spies and Indian military secrets are there for anyone who wants them. In New Delhi a computer was raided by unauthorized persons in the War Room of the Indian Navy and in far off Tezpur (Assam) it was discovered that the 4 Corps Headquarters was emptied of its deployment plans, its weaponry layout and tactical blueprints. In fact, both episodes happened in mid-July, almost simultaneously.

It coincided with the recrudescence of terrorist attacks as deep as in Ayodhya in what appeared to be an attempt to test Indian reactions in both its external frontiers (with the massed infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir) as well as its internal security. If either had succeeded to any degree it should be expected that it would be followed up with a more massive attack on both fronts.

These kinds of activities grow out of confidence on the part of those inimical to India that they are in possession of tactical plans and doctrinal mindset of the Indian security forces. There is a tendency in both military and political circles to downplay the loss of secrets as happened when nearly two dozen computers were stolen from the Defence Research and Development Organisation offices at Metcalfe House in North Delhi.

The July espionage cases give the appearance that India has developed a culture of carelessness about national secrets and intelligence that enemies of the nation can use to their advantage. While trying to make out that nothing important has been taken away evidence is piling up that those who have made a business of selling national secrets have penetrated the armed forces to a degree that has becoming alarming.

The earliest signs of the development of this dangerous mindset were when Major-Gen Larkins was arrested for allegedly using the Defence Library in South Block to pass on information to a foreign agent. It is a measure of the dishonesty with which such matters are treated that it was made out that journalists were passing secrets to the enemy and their movement was restricted to the Defence Public Relations office.

That fiction continues to date even after Larkins who was serving time for spying obtained parole and escaped from the country just recently. It is by creating such fiction that the Indian armed forces are diverting attention away from the leakage of secrets from within their own ranks. It makes for complacency which at one time has led to the penetration of its ranks by fundamentalist separatist elements of the Khalistani variety who mutinied after the events at the Golden Temple.

Fortunately, it was confined to a small group that had apparently been infiltrated by ragis indoctrinated by the Khalistani ideology which was being nurtured in Pakistan in the hope of enlarging on the “two-nation theory” to make out that India is falling apart on the basis of religion. There too the infection had reached as high a level as that of a Major General and Shahbeg Singh’s portrait now adorns the august walls of the Golden Temple as a martyr to the cause of Khalistan (Which, incidentally, is also being revived by ISI which has been given charge of the Pakistan Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee).

The tendency to deny that something serious is happening within its own establishments led to the undercutting of the other pillar of national democratic polity – the Press – as in the Larkins case. The mutiny among a small segment of Sikh troops was practically foretold by reports in the media that youth infected by the Khalistani canker were buying their way into the armed forces prior to the crackdown and the storming of the Golden Temple by the Army to flush out the terrorists led by Sant Bhindranwale (his portrait also hangs alongside that of Shahbeg Singh).

Attempts to buy a passage into the ranks of the military are still continuing as reported in these columns some time ago. Whether these were indoctrinated youth or merely some youth seeking an assured job is a matter for investigation by not just the police but also by the intelligence agencies to ascertain before it is too late.

There are other signs that are cause for concern. There have been reports over the past year that Indian military personnel are being robbed of their identity cards during train journeys. By itself a disturbing trend.

All this is happening after the Kargil Review Committee and the Group of Ministers have recommended an overhaul of the intelligence system in the armed forces. New posts were created to gather information, collate its general drift, analyse and present actionable intelligence to all echelons. Yet, the trend of penetration of military establishments for their secrets and mental makeup continues unabated as it demonstrated by the July events when the Army and the Navy were penetrated. Some time ago a former HAL employee was arrested with plans to target HAL and over the past few months at least two different lines of investigations have indicated that terrorists are preparing to strike the Indian Air Force at Palam. All these operations are possible only on the basis of information from within.

Apart from the direct assaults from across the Line of Control and on selected targets like Ayodhya where the incendiary effect was intended to be exploited to the full there has been a concerted attempt to undermine the legal parameters within which the armed forces and the paramilitary forces operate within the Disturbed Areas Act.

Indian intelligence agencies need to ascertain whether penetration of sources of military secrets is also accompanied by studied attempts to undermine counter-terror operations by discrediting the security forces by perpetrating atrocities on the local population by moles infiltrated into these forces. This has happened in the north-east where opposition to the Special Powers Act burgeoned after the killing of Manorama Devi. Similar was the case of the shooting by military personnel with a weapon removed from the armoury at the dead of night.

There is, clearly, a synchronized attempt to read India’s military intentions so that chinks can be found and exploited. There are indications that Pakistan had noticed are reduction in the size of the armed forces by as much as 50,000 troops that were not replenished when that number had retired. The effect was seen on the ground by the absence of Indian troops in certain forward post even though policy had been enunciated that there would be no troop withdrawals from forward posts during the winter.

It was easy for Musharraf to dust out a decade-old operational plan of the Pakistan Army GHQ for an invasion into the Kargil-Dras sector for pincer operations against Indian troops along the Line of Control to the south of these positions. As it turned out the target this time was to cut off Siachen and then threaten Srinagar from the north.

This kind of grave miscalculation occurs when a surfeit of Indian intelligence in the hands of Pakistan induces a recklessness that is appalling. Siachen, for example. And it can prove to be a costly mistake for both countries.

In a nuclearised environment such lapses of security of information and the loss of secrets can prove to be extremely dangerous not just because of the possibility that nuclear secrets could also be stolen but that it could encourage adventurism in the enemy which would be counterproductive of attempts to retain a credible minimum deterrence. Any leak of information and secrets cannot, thus, betaken lightly.

- Syndicate Features -